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Non-technical summary 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of subsidies granted by the Flemish government 
(northern region of Belgium) on R&D spending and R&D employment in recipient firms. As 
econometric treatment effects studies are nowadays standard in the scholarly literature and 
even in policy practice, we go beyond the typical applications. Usually scholars estimate a 
treatment effect on the treated, and then conclude whether a subsidy program is subject to full 
or partial crowding out effects. In this present study, we add a number of further tests that are 
of interest for policy makers in their daily decision making. The analyses are based on 
detailed discussions with the representatives of the public agency administering the 
innovation policy instruments in Flanders, the “IWT Vlaanderen”. In particular, the policy 
makers were interested in the following questions: (i) Does the receipt of subsidies from other 
sources on top of IWT grants reduce the effect of the local policy program? (ii) Does the 
treatment effect decline if the same firm is funded repeatedly over time? (iii) Does granting 
multiple projects to the same recipient firm in the same time period decrease the treatment 
effect?  
The paper discusses a number of further robustness tests and also includes a back of the 
envelope calculation where we extrapolate the sample results to the population of firms. We 
conclude that neither subsidies from other sources, nor funding the same firm repeatedly over 
time, nor granting multiple projects in the same time period reduce the treatment effect of an 
average, subsidized project in terms of additional R&D expenditure and R&D employment. 
With respect to the macroeconomic effect, we conclude that a total of 3,019 projects (total 
value € 628 million) granted between 2004 and 2010 has created (or maintained) about 
16,800 person-years of R&D employment in the Flemish economy. 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
In dieser Studie schätzen wir die Wirkung von Subventionen auf FuE-Ausgaben und FuE-
Beschäftigung flämischer Unternehmen. Ökonometrische Studien zu „Treatmenteffekten“ 
gehören inzwischen zum Standardrepertoire ökonomischer Evaluationsstudien sowohl in der 
akademischen Literatur als auch der politischen Praxis. Wir erweitern die typischen 
Anwendungen hinsichtlich des Einsatzbereichs und der Schlussfolgerungen, die auf der Basis 
solcher Modelle getroffen werden können. Dazu wurden detaillierte Gespräche mit Vertretern 
aus der politischen Praxis geführt, um Fragen zu identifizieren, die für die Administratoren 
der Förderprogramme von hohem Interesse sind. Während die üblichen Studien die 
Förderprogramme hinsichtlich ihrer durchschnittlichen Mitnahmeeffekte untersuchen, führen 
wir unter anderem folgende, detaillierteren Analysen durch: (i) Reduziert der Erhalt von 
Subventionen aus anderen Quellen den Effekt des lokalen, flämischen Förderinstruments? (ii) 
Reduziert sich der Effekt der Zuwendung, wenn Unternehmen über die Zeit wiederholt 
gefördert werden? (iii) Reduziert die Bewilligung multipler Projekte in einem Unternehmen 
im gleichen Zeitraum die Effektivität der Förderung? Zusätzlich führen wir eine 
Extrapolation des Fördereffektes von unserer Stichprobe zum makroökonomischen Niveau 
durch.  
Wir finden weder Evidenz, dass der Erhalt weiterer Subventionen den Effekt des flämischen 
Förderinstruments reduziert, noch dass die wiederholte Förderung des gleichen 
Unternehmens oder die Bewilligung multipler Projekte den Fördereffekt reduzieren. Ferner 
berechnen wir, dass der makroökonomisch Effekt von insgesamt 3,019 vergebenen 
Zuwendungen im Wert von € 628 Millionen im Zeitraum 2004 bis 2010 etwa 16,800 
Personenjahre FuE-Beschäftigung geschaffen (oder erhalten) hat.  
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Abstract 
A significant amount of money is spent on programs to stimulate innovative activities. In this 
paper, we review the effects of a specific government-sponsored commercial R&D program 
from various angles. We start by evaluating whether we find positive effects of subsidies on 
R&D investment and R&D employment. Then, we analyze how the observed effects of 
subsidies on R&D intensity and employment vary over time, vary if the firm receives also 
support from other sources, vary depending on how many supported projects a single firm 
has at the same time or vary if a firm gets support consecutively. Finally, we estimate the 
macroeconomic impact of these grants in terms of R&D employment. We conclude that (i) 
the policies are not subject to full crowding out, (ii) the treatments effects are stable over 
time, (iii) receiving subsidies from other sources in addition to the program under evaluation 
does not decrease the estimated treatment effect, and (iv) receiving grants repeatedly does not 
decrease the magnitude of the treatment effects either. Using a back-of-the envelope 
calculation, we estimate that, on average, five R&D jobs are created (or maintained) per 
supported project in the Flemish economy.  
 
 
                                                 
*
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1. Introduction 
The impact of subsidies on firms’ innovative behaviour has been of interest in economic 
literature for many years now. In line with this literature, we are interested in knowing what 
the effect of one specific instrument is on firms’ R&D intensity and R&D employment, 
namely the effect of subsidies for R&D from the Flemish government (northern part of 
Belgium). We employ econometric treatment effects models for estimating the treatment 
effect on the treated. As studies like this are nowadays more or less standard in the scholarly 
literature and even in policy practice, we go beyond the typical application of treatment 
effects models. Usually scholars estimate a treatment effect on the treated (see e.g. the survey 
by Cerulli, 2010), and then conclude whether a subsidy program is subject to full or partial 
crowding out effects. In this present study, we add a number of further tests that are of 
interest for policy makers in their daily decision making. The analyses presented in this paper 
are based on detailed discussions that the authors had with the representatives of the public 
agency administering the innovation policy instruments in Flanders, the “IWT Vlaanderen”. 
In particular, the policy makers were interested in the following questions: Knowing from 
earlier evaluations that the estimated treatment effects are positive (see Aerts and Czarnitzki, 
2006), it has been of primary interest whether 
- the estimated treatment effects vary over time; 
- the receipt of subsidies from other sources on top of IWT grants reduces the effect of 
the local policy program; 
- funding the same firm repeatedly creates an increased risk of crowding out effects; 
- and whether granting multiple projects to the same recipient firm in the same time 
period increases the risk of (partial) crowding out. 
In addition to the questions mentioned above we also show that the treatment effects remain 
stable across different samples of firms i.e. using  
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i. a representative sample of firms in the Flemish economy (the “full sample”)  
ii. a subsample of firms that at least indicated some propensity to innovate (the “sample 
of innovators” 
iii. a subsample of small and medium-sized firms, as a popular sub-scheme in Flemish 
innovation policy is a program foreseen for grants distributed to small and medium-
sized firms (the “KMO program”).  
As we have quite detailed information on innovation project grants in Flanders, we are also 
able to conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation on how many R&D jobs are created in the 
Flemish economy because of subsidies to the business sector.  
The following section will provide an overview on the institutional background and 
functioning of the funding agency. Section three reviews the existing literature and the 
undermining theory. In section 4, we present the econometric method. Section 5 provides 
information on the data. Section 6 shows the econometric results and section 7 provides 
information on the macroeconomic effect of the Flemish innovation policy on the Flemish 
economy. Section 8 concludes.  
2. Institutional background
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The IWT 
The agency for Innovation by Science and Technology in Flanders (“Innovatie door 
Wetenschap en Technologie in Vlaanderen” (IWT)) is a governmental agency, established by 
the Flemish Government in 1991. It was established to give shape to the new competences in 
science and technology that were transferred from the federal to the regional governments in 
Belgium. Since this transfer of competences made of innovation policies a regional matter, 
the IWT has been created as the key organization for support and promotion of R&D and 
                                                 
2
 The background information and stylized facts stem from Larosse (2011), http://www.eurotransbio.eu and 
www.iwt.be. 
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innovation in Flanders. In addition to offering Flemish companies and research centres 
financial support, advice and a network of potential partners in Flanders and abroad, it also 
supports the Flemish Government in defining and adapting its innovation policy.  
The total funding of the IWT amounted to € 297 million in 2008. The scope of existing 
funding programs is quite broad, including industrial R&D projects, EUREKA-projects, 
feasibility studies and innovation projects for SME’s, support to industrial networks (sectoral 
research, technological advisory services, innovation stimulation), support to universities for 
strategic basic research (SBO), support to higher education engineering schools for 
technology diffusion actions, individual grants for PhD and post-doc research, support to 
universities for exploitation of their R&D-results and to larger “ad hoc “ initiatives as decided 
by the Flemish government. 
In its competence of also coordinating regional innovation initiatives such as regional 
development agencies, technological advisory services, sectoral research centres and 
industrial federations, the IWT can be viewed as both, a program owner (in close co-
operation with the Flemish Minister of Innovation) and a program manager (selection and 
follow-up of research and innovation projects). 
Funding by the IWT 
IWT’s funds for supporting R&D and innovation are directed to small as well as large 
companies, universities, third level education institutions and other Flemish innovative 
organizations, individually or collectively. A wide range of activities is supported through 
this financial support, including feasibility studies, research and development projects for 
companies, strategic basic research and grants for research institutions and researchers, 
network projects and translation research for intermediary organizations.   
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Every year, some 600 companies benefit from IWT support (overall support, all measures 
cumulated). While in the past it was mainly manufacturing companies that have solicited the 
support of the IWT, nowadays, service providers are more and more represented.  
In order to encourage smaller firms to perform R&D, a special program for SMEs has 
been put in place (the “KMO programma”). The maximum project cost a firm can submit 
under this program is € 200,000. Of these total project costs, the maximum subsidy rate is of 
35% for a medium-sized company, and an extra 10% (hence 45% of the total project costs) 
for a small-sized company. If an SME collaborates with a public research institute or an 
international partner, it can submit a proposal of a maximum of € 250,000. If it collaborates 
with another firm (nationally), it can get 10% top-up in the subsidy rate.   
Besides the KMO program, the IWT has the R&D program. In the latter, the basic 
subsidy rate that is of 15% for development and 40% for research. Furthermore, additional 
10% are available for medium-sized enterprises and 20% additional support for small firms. 
Further support may be granted to projects that meet specific policy targets, like e.g. the 
promotion of sustainable technological development or cooperation with research institution. 
Finally, an extra 10% of support may be granted to projects involving substantial 
collaboration of several companies, provided that at least one is an SME or that the project 
entails an international cooperation. The general feature of the IWT subsidy scheme is its 
bottom-up character: it is a permanently open and non-thematic scheme.  
With regards to the evaluation procedures, the IWT has a well-developed set of 
procedures for project evaluation, based on internal and external referees to evaluate the ex-
ante effectiveness of the project proposals.  
Initially, the evaluation criteria were heavily focussed on the scientific qualities and 
technological risks of the project. Gradually however, the economic dimension became 
equally - or even more - important, reflecting the shift from a purely R&D policy towards a 
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more innovation related policy focus. This economic evaluation doesn’t only concern the 
financial feasibility of the project or the commercial prospects for the innovating firm but 
also the economic return ‘for Flanders’. 
As part of the IWT’s evaluation, other ‘societal’ qualities of the project – mainly 
concerning environmental sustainable development – are also considered, though to a lesser 
extent than the economic criteria. The evaluation gives access to extra support in the form of 
a priority ranking across existing subsidy schemes and of a financial bonus of 10% on the 
project budget. Hence, project evaluation in Flanders is closely linked to general policy 
criteria in a bottom-up innovation policy design.  
3. Theoretical premises and literature review 
3.1. Theory 
In economic literature, the impact of innovation policies - and particularly direct subsidies for 
R&D - on firms’ innovative behaviour has been of interest for many years now. The 
economic justification for governmental intervention for private sector R&D activities relies 
on the familiar market failure arguments (Arrow, 1962). Given these market failure 
arguments, most governments in industrialized economies attempt to correct them by 
designing policies, like for instance intellectual property right systems to improve 
appropriability of knowledge, tax reliefs to reduce the cost of R&D (see Hall and Van 
Reenen, 2000), direct subsidy programs (see e.g. David et al., 2000, for a survey), public 
venture capital (see Hall and Lerner, 2010, for a survey) or loans with low interest rates. A 
detailed overview of the existing policy mix and its potential effects on R&D activities would 
however be beyond the scope of this study, since we are merely interested in direct subsidies.  
According to Arrow (1962), the market failure arguments can be summarized into three 
main issues: (i) increasing returns, (ii) inappropriability of knowledge and (iii) uncertainty.  
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(i) Information is characterized by increasing returns to scale insofar that once the 
information is produced, it can be used multiple times, regardless of the scale of 
production. Since the same unit of information can be used multiple times by the 
same or by a different user, the cost of information production is not dependent on the 
scale on which the information is used (Arrow, 1962, 1996, 1999; Lamberton, 1996). 
There are generally relative high fixed costs of establishing an economic unit for the 
production of information and the marginal cost of providing a unit of information is 
far less than the average costs of information production. Indeed, from a welfare point 
of view, the information concerning an invention should be available completely free 
of charge, with the exception of the cost of transmitting the information (often very 
low or close to zero though). Even though this would ensure an optimal utilization of 
the information, it would present very little, if not no, incentive to invest in 
knowledge production. 
(ii) In terms of inappropriability, it is a well-known fact that because of the non-rival and 
non-exclusive character of knowledge, a firm can never appropriate all the benefits of 
its R&D investments, even though it has to bear the entire costs. A part of the created 
knowledge always spills over to other agents, so that many agents can benefit from an 
investment done by the one firm. Hence, the incentive to be the investing agent is 
reduced due to this inappropriability of knowledge.  
(iii) The third argument is linked to the uncertainty that is concurrent to innovative 
activities. As a matter of fact, innovation is not only uncertain in that one does not 
always know whether the desired result of the technological change or the innovation 
will be obtained in terms of output, but very often, one cannot be sure about the 
market success of an innovation either. Indeed, the path from a brilliant idea to a 
technical invention and eventually to a successful market application is long, risky 
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and sinuous. In other words, the output of an invention or an innovation can never be 
perfectly predicted by its input (Arrow, 1962). Hence, in order to undertake such an 
uncertain project, a firm has to be willing to bear the inherent risk of this endeavour. 
Since the assumption is that firms are often risk-averse, this will lead to a sub-optimal 
allocation of risk, meaning that there will be discrimination against risky projects 
(Arrow and Lind, 1970). In line with the uncertainty (moral hazard) argument, firms 
often face financial constraints if they do not have sufficient internal resources to 
undertake an R&D project. Indeed, R&D investments are generally characterized by 
high firm specific investment and adjustment costs on the one hand, and low collateral 
value on the other hand. An important share of R&D investment consists in financing 
R&D employees and training, and hence, a large part of the investment is 
immediately sunk. Compared to investment in physical capital, R&D itself cannot be 
used as collateral in credit negotiations (see Hall (2002) for a comprehensive survey 
of financial constraints). Hence, R&D investments are often hampered by a lack of 
external lenders or investors. Finally, the market uncertainty for new products delays 
investment in R&D, reducing the total R&D in the economy. This is even more 
accurate for projects of more basic research, as the latter are further away from the 
market and its potential use may be largely unknown by the time of the investment 
(see e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011, Czarnitzki et al., 2011). Recent literature 
(real options theory; see e.g. Pindyck and Dixit, 1994) emphasizes the irreversibility 
of investments. In other words, firms incur additional opportunity costs by turning 
down the option to wait for information, and thus by investing today, they eliminate 
their chance of investing at any time in the future. As a consequence of this 
uncertainty, investment will decrease. See Czarnitzki and Toole (2007, 2011) for 
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empirical applications on R&D investment. They indeed find that investments fall as 
product market uncertainty increases. 
While the third argument relates to uncertainty and financial market constraints, the two 
prior arguments, namely the inappropriability of R&D and the increasing returns are 
associated with positive spillovers and increased consumer surplus. In practice this means 
that it is socially desirable to subsidize an R&D project if it is associated to high social 
returns (and provided that the project in question would not have taken place if the firm 
would have been left on its own, as the project cost may not cover the expected private 
return). As a consequence of the above, it is a largely shared view that R&D activities are 
difficult to finance in a freely competitive market place. Support of this view in the form of 
economic-theory modelling dates back to Schumpeter (1942) and was further developed by 
Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962).  
3.2. Empirical evidence 
The predominant question analyzed by empirical literature is whether public subsidies crowd-
out private investment or whether they stimulate them. In a survey of the literature on the 
impact of public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure, David et al. (2000) find that 
most studies are subject to a potential selection bias. Indeed, since neither the fact of 
applying, nor the fact of receiving a public subsidy can be viewed as random, the selection 
into such a process has to be taken into account for the results of an analysis to be credible.  
Hall and Maffioli (2008) conclude that in empirical literature since 2000 addressing 
selection bias explicitly total crowding out effects were only found for the US Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program: Wallsten (2000) employing a sample of 479 
observations and using a 3SLS approach finds crowding out effects. However, he could not 
exclude the possibility that the grants might have had a positive effect on keeping the funded 
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firms’ R&D activities constant, which might not have been possible otherwise. The vast 
majority of other studies find positive results for R&D intensity or patent activity.   
Other studies in this area include Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) finding that Eastern 
German firms which received public subsidies increased their innovation activities by about 
four percentage points, Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) as well as Czarnitzki and Licht 
(2006) finding a positive impact in evaluating the effect of public R&D funding on R&D 
intensity and patent outcome in Germany, Hussinger (2008) confirming earlier results for 
Germany using semi-parametric selection models, Duguet (2004) focusing on growth of the 
ratio of firms’ R&D to sales for France, Aerts and Schmidt (2008) reporting positive 
treatment effects on R&D for Germany and Flanders applying a variant of the conditional 
difference-in-difference estimator for repeated cross-sections, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 
(2011a) using cross-country harmonized survey data, and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 
(2011b) in a multiple treatment effect analysis for German firms. All these studies reject total 
crowding out, even though some find evidence of partial crowding out. Takalo et al. (2011) 
model the application and R&D investment decisions of the firm and the subsidy granting 
decision of the public agency in charge of the program to estimate the expected welfare 
effects of targeted R&D subsidies using R&D project level data from Finland. They find that 
the social rate of return on targeted subsidies is 30-50%, but that spillover effects of subsidies 
are smaller than effects on firm profits. Gonzalez et al. (2005) use IV models to evaluate 
R&D policy programs on about 2000 Spanish firms. The authors find that private R&D 
investment is stimulated by subsidies in Spain. Busom (2000) applying a parametric selection 
model finds that public R&D subsidies stimulate private R&D spending positively on 
average, but that partial crowding out cannot be rejected. For a more comprehensive survey 
of most recent studies, see Cerulli (2010). 
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4. Econometric Method 
Modern econometric techniques addressing selection bias have been studied for many years 
now (see Heckman et al., 1999, Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, for surveys). Different 
estimation strategies include the (conditional) difference-in-difference estimator, control 
function approaches (selection models), instrumental variable (IV) estimation, non-
parametric (matching) techniques based on propensity scores and others such as regression 
discontinuity designs.  
The difference-in-difference method requires panel data with observations before and 
after (or while) the treatment (change of subsidy status). As our database (to be described in 
the following subsection) consists of three cross-sections and not of a panel (73% of the firms 
are observed only once), we cannot apply this estimator.  
For the application of an IV estimator or a selection model, one needs a valid instrument 
(or an “exclusion restriction” in the selection model case) for the treatment variables. As 
finding valid instruments (or exclusion restriction) turns out to be very challenging in the 
present context, we primarily apply matching estimators in this study. Matching has the 
advantage to require no assumptions about functional forms and error term distributions. The 
downside, however, is that it only controls for the selection on observables. Hence, we have 
to maintain the assumption that we observe all important determinants driving the selection 
into program participation, namely the receipt of an IWT subsidy.
 3
 As this is a clear 
limitation, we also report our endeavor on how to find instrumental variables and present 
some robustness checks concerning our main findings using IV regressions at the end of the 
empirical results section. 
                                                 
3
 Matching estimators have been applied and discussed by many scholars, amongst which Angrist (1998), 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b), Lechner (1999, 2000) and Smith and Todd 
(2005). 
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Our fundamental evaluation question can be illustrated by an equation describing the 
average treatment effect on the treated firms, respectively: 
      | 1 | 1T CTTE E Y S E Y S     (1) 
where Y
T
 is the outcome variable. The status S refers to the group: S=1 is the treatment 
group and S=0 the non-treated firms. Y
C
 is the potential outcome which would have been 
realized if the treatment group (S=1) had not been treated. As previously explained, while 
E(Y
T
|S=1) is directly observable, it is not the case for the counterpart. E(Y
C
|S=1) has to be 
estimated. Because of a potential selection bias due to the fact that the receipt of a subsidy is 
not randomly assigned, E(Y
C
|S=1)   E(YC|S=0) and the counterfactual situation cannot 
simply be estimated as average outcome of the non-participants. Rubin (1977) introduced the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) to overcome this selection problem, that is, 
participation and potential outcome are statistically independent for firms with the same set 
of exogenous characteristics X. In the case of matching, this potential “untreated outcome” of 
treated firms is constructed from a control group of firms that did not receive subsidies. The 
matching relies on the intuitively attractive idea to balance the sample of program 
participants and comparable non-participants. Remaining differences in the outcome variable 
between both groups are then attributed to the treatment. If the CIA holds, it follows that 
    | 1, | 0,C CE Y S X E Y S X    (2) 
and the average treatment effect on the treated can be written as: 
     | 1,  | 0,T CTTE E Y S X x E Y S X x          (3) 
In the present analysis, we conduct a variant of the nearest neighbour propensity score 
matching, namely caliper matching. More precisely, we pair each subsidy recipient with the 
single closest non-recipient. The pairs are chosen based on the similarity in the estimated 
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probability of receiving such a subsidy, meaning the propensity score stemming from a probit 
estimation on the dummy indicating the receipt of subsidies S. Matching on the propensity 
score has the advantage not to run into the “curse of dimensionality” since we use only one 
single index as matching argument (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In addition of 
matching on the propensity score, we also require the observations of firms in the selected 
control group to belong to the same year and to have a similar patent stock as the firms in the 
treatment group.  
Furthermore, it is essential that there is enough overlap between the control and the 
treated group (common support). In practice, the samples of treated and controls are 
frequently restricted to common support. We thus calculate the minimum and the maximum 
of the propensity scores of the potential control group, and delete observations on treated 
firms with probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the 
potential control group.  
In order to avoid “bad matches”, we impose a threshold (a “caliper”) to the maximum 
distance allowed between the treated and the control unit. If the distance is above this pre-
defined threshold, the treated observation is dropped from the sample to avoid bias in the 
estimation (see also Todd and Smith, 2005). The detail of our matching protocol is 
summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: The matching protocol  
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity score  Pˆ X .  
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities 
larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. (This step is 
also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score as 
matching arguments.) 
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool. 
Step 4 Calculate the Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the 
most similar control observation.    
' 1
ij j i j i
MD Z Z Z Z

     
where   is the empirical covariance matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample of 
potential controls. 
We use caliper matching, first introduced by Cochran and Rubin (1973). The intuition of caliper 
matching is to avoid “bad” matches (those for which the value of the matching argument Zj is far from 
Zi) by imposing a threshold of the maximum distance allowed between the treated and the control 
group. That is, a match for firm i is only chosen if ||Zj – Zi|| < ԑ, where ԑ is a pre-specified tolerance. 
 
Step 5 Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining control group. (Do not remove 
the selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used again.) If the control 
group is empty after applying the caliper threshold, the treated firm is dropped from the sample and is 
not taken into account in the evaluation. 
Step 6 Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms. 
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average effect on the treated can thus be calculated as the 
mean difference of the matched samples:  
 
 ̂    
 
  
(∑  
 
 
 ∑  
 ̂
 
) 
 
with   
 ̂  being the counterfactual for i and n
T
 is the sample size (of treated firms). 
Step 8 As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an ordinary t-
statistic on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance of repeated 
observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors in order to draw 
conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an 
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors. 
 
5. Data and variables 
The data used in this paper stem from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of Flanders.
4
 
More precisely, they stem from the CIS4, covering the years 2002-2004, the CIS5, covering 
2004-2006 and CIS6, covering 2006-2008. Furthermore, the data has been complemented by 
data from the Belfirst dataset and has been merged with information from the ICAROS 
                                                 
4 The CIS covers all of the EU member states, Norway and Iceland using a largely harmonized questionnaire 
throughout participating countries. The CIS databases contain information on a cross-section of firms active in the 
manufacturing sector and in selected business services. 
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dataset of the IWT. The latter provides detailed information on the amounts of the grants as 
well as on grants received in previous periods and the duration of the funded projects.  
Our sample concerns innovative as well as non-innovative firms and covers 
manufacturing as well as business related services sectors.
5
 In total, the sample consists of 
4,761 observations, out of which 1,948 are innovative firms and 292 received a public R&D 
subsidy from the Flemish government. Table A1 and A2 in Appendix A1 show the industry 
structure as well as the firm size distribution of our sample.  
The receipt of a subsidy form the IWT is denoted by a dummy variable equal to one for 
firms that received public R&D funding and zero otherwise.  
Outcome variables 
As outcome variables, we consider the internal R&D investment, RDINT, being the ratio of 
internal R&D expenditures
6
 to sales (multiplied by 100) as well as R&D employment, 
RDEMP, being the ratio of R&D employment to total employment (multiplied by 100). 
Control variables 
We use several control variables in our analysis likely to impact the fact of whether or not a 
firm applies and receives public support for its R&D activities. The number of employees 
(EMP) takes into account possible size effects. As the firm size distribution is skewed, the 
variable enters in logarithms (lnEMP). We also allow for a potential non-linear relationship 
by including (lnEMP)
2
. 
In addition, we include a dummy variable capturing whether or not a firm is part of a 
group (GP), and if so, whether it has its headquarters on foreign territory (FOREIGN). Firms 
that belong to a group may have a lower incentive to apply for subsidies as small firms that 
have a large majority shareholder do not qualify for the SME program where larger subsidy 
                                                 
5 According to the 3rd edition of the Oslo Manual – which is the definition followed by the CIS - an innovative firm is 
one that has implemented an innovation during the period under review. An innovation is defined as the implementation of a 
new or significantly improved product (good or service) or process or service (see Eurostat and OECD, 2005). 
6  The CIS definition of R&D expenditure follows the Frascati Manual (OECD, 1993). 
15 
 
rates are granted. In contrast, however, firms belonging to a group may be preferred by the 
funding agency as the group membership possibly promises knowledge spillovers and thus 
economies of scope from the R&D process more likely than for stand-alone companies. In 
addition, firms belonging to a network of firms may benefit from better communication 
structures and thus are better informed about possible funding sources including public 
technology policy programs. Subsidiaries having a foreign parent, however, may be less 
likely to receive subsidies, as the parent may prefer to apply in its home country or because 
the funding agency gives preference to local firms. Furthermore, foreign parents having 
Flemish subsidiaries are typically large multinational companies and thus the local subsidiary 
does not qualify for special SME-support which could reduce its likelihood to apply. 
The log of the firm’s age (lnAGE) is included in the analysis as it is often claimed that 
older firms are more reluctant to pursue innovation, and would thus be less likely to apply, all 
else constant. 
Previous experience in successful R&D activities plays a vital role when applying for 
public support, as governments often adopt a picking-the-winner strategy and hence might 
favor firms with previous success stories. Therefore, we include the patent stock (PS) in our 
regression. The patent stock enters into the regression as patent stock per employee to avoid 
potential multicollinearity with firm size (PS/EMP). Even though “not all inventions are 
patentable” and “not all inventions are patented” (Griliches, 1990, p.10), the patent stock is 
the best approximation we have for past (successful) innovation activities as data on previous 
R&D expenditures are not available. The patent stock information stem from the EPO 
database and are computed as a time series of patent applications with a 15% rate of 
obsolescence of knowledge capital, as is common in the literature (see e.g. Jaffe, 1986; Hall, 
1990; Griliches and Mairesse, 1984): PSi,t = PSi,t-1×0.85 + patent applicationsi,t. 
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We also control for the degree of international competition by including an export-to-
sales ratio in our analysis (EXPORT). Firms that engage more heavily in foreign markets may 
be more innovative than others and, hence, more likely to apply for subsidies.  
We further include the labor productivity as a covariate, measured as sales per employee, 
LAB_PRO, since high labor productivity may be a relevant determinant for receiving public 
funds if the government follows a picking-the-winner strategy rigorously. 
Furthermore, we also control for publicly supported R&D projects in the past. We 
include a variable equal to the number of IWT projects a firm has completed within the three 
preceding years (IWT_PAST3YRS). Last but not least, industry dummies control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across sectors and time dummies capture macroeconomic shocks. 
Timing of variables 
As mentioned above, each wave of the survey covers a three-year period. In order to avoid 
endogeneity between the dependent variables and the covariates to the largest extent, we 
employ lagged values wherever possible. For instance, suppose the dependent variables are 
measured in period t. Then EMP, PS/EMP, LAB_PRO and EXPORT are measured at the 
beginning of the survey period, i.e. in t-2.  
The information on GP and FOREIGN is only available such that the question covers the 
whole 3-year period, i.e. t-2 to t. For instance, “Did your firm belong to a group during the 
period 2004-2006?” We consider AGE as truly exogenous and hence it is measured in period 
t. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables of our sample. As we can see, almost 
all means of the variables are significantly different between the treated and the non-treated 
firms. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  
Unsubsidized firms, 
N=4469 
Subsidized firms, 
N=292 
Results of t-tests on  
mean differences 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.  
  Covariates  
IWT_PAST3YRS 0.023 0.181 0.736 2.436 *** 
PS/EMPL*1000 1.340 8.254 13.456 27.277 *** 
lnEMP 3.484 1.298 4.690 1.884 *** 
FOREIGN 0.245 0.430 0.284 0.452  
EXPORT 0.376 0.484 0.545 0.499 *** 
GP 0.466 0.499 0.664 0.473 *** 
lnAGE 3.113 0.777 3.153 0.889  
lnLAB_PRO 5.197 0.867 5.279 0.701 * 
Year 2006 0.257 0.437 0.349 0.478 *** 
Year 2008 0.426 0.494 0.257 0.438 *** 
  Outcome variables  
RDINT 0.894 5.322 7.579 12.694 *** 
RDEMP 2.646 9.960 18.287 21.980 *** 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
For instance, firms receiving subsidies from the IWT are on average larger, more export 
oriented, belong to a group more often and have a higher labor productivity. Furthermore, 
they have had significantly more funded projects in the last three years and have a higher 
patent stock per employee. With regards to the outcome variables, funded firms have on 
average higher R&D intensity and have more R&D employees. The econometric analysis in 
the next section will reveal to which extent these differences can be attributed to the 
treatment. 
6. Econometric results 
In order to apply the matching estimator as presented in the previous section, we first have to 
estimate a probit model to obtain the predicted probability of receiving an IWT grant. We can 
see in Table 3 that with the exception of the coefficients of the group, the age and the labor 
productivity variables, all the other coefficients are significantly different from zero and 
hence are important in driving the selection of into the funding scheme.  
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Table 3: Probit estimation 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
IWT_PAST3YRS 0.755*** 0.084 
PS/EMPL*1000 0.016*** 0.002 
lnEMP -0.140 0.105 
(lnEMP)
2
 0.042*** 0.011 
FOREIGN -0.429*** 0.099 
EXPORT 0.655*** 0.103 
GP 0.098 0.091 
lnAGE -0.073 0.047 
lnLAB_PRO 0.008 0.052 
Intercept -1.750*** 0.407 
Test on joint significance of industry dummies 2 (9) = 94.29*** 
Test on joint significance of time dummies 2 (2) = 24.61*** 
McFadden R
2
 0.308 
Number of observations 4,761 
   Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
As explained in the previous section, a necessary condition for the validity of the 
matching estimator is common support. In our case, 14 treated observations are lost because 
no common support could be found. In addition, 26 treated observations are dropped because 
of the caliper we impose on the maximum distance between neighbors. Hence, a total of 40 
observations are deleted from the sample of treated firms. 
Table 4: Matching results on the full sample 
  
Selected control 
group, N=252 
Subsidized firms, 
N=252 
p-value of t-tests 
 on mean difference 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
   Covariates   
IWT_PAST3YRS 0.258 0.709 0.349 0.821 p=0.222 
PS/EMPL*1000 7.932 20.092 8.354 20.032 p=0.831 
lnEMP 4.302 1.876 4.359 1.678 p=0.745 
(lnEMP)
2
 22.011 17.906 21.808 15.586 p=0.904 
FOREIGN 0.262 0.441 0.262 0.441 p=1.000 
EXPO 0.599 0.491 0.560 0.497 p=0.415 
GP 0.544 0.499 0.623 0.486 p=0.103 
lnAGE 3.099 0.873 3.085 0.860 p=0.866 
lnLAB_PRO 5.291 0.792 5.252 0.701 p=0.606 
  Outcome variables 
 RDINT 3.151 10.373 6.883 12.140 p=0.001 
RDEMP 8.061 18.254 17.627 21.603 p<0.001 
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As shown by Table 4, all our covariates are well balanced after the matching. Hence, we 
can conclude that our matching was successful and that we found a neighbor for each treated 
firm. The only variables where there still is a significant difference after the matching are our 
outcome variables. This difference can be attributed to the subsidy. The treatment effect in 
terms of R&D intensity amounts to 3.73 percentage points and  in terms of R&D employment 
intensity to 9.57 percentage points. As a consequence, we can reject the null hypothesis of 
total crowding out effects. In line with previous findings on the effect of direct subsidies on 
firms in Belgium and other European countries, we can conclude that the IWT grants trigger 
investment into R&D in the recipient firms.  
In the subsequent subsections, we use this baseline result in order to explore further 
policy relevant questions concerning program evaluation. 
Stability of treatment effects over time  
In times of a changing macroeconomic environment, it is useful for a policy maker to know 
whether the effect of a policy varies over time. As we use data from 2004, 2006 and 2008, it 
is interesting to test whether the treatment effects we observe are stable over this period. In 
other words, we want to see whether the effect of a subsidy receipt changes between periods 
t, t+1 and t+2. In order to do so, we regress the treatment effect, αi, on the time dummies 
Y2006 and Y2008 (so that 2004 is the base year in this regression). If the policy effects are 
stable, we expect that none of the time dummies is individually significant and that the whole 
regression model is insignificant (all coefficients are jointly zero).  
  
20 
 
Table 5: OLS regression testing for stability of treatment effect over time 
 
Dependent variable: αi 
 
R&D employment R&D intensity 
 
Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t| 
Y2006 5.299 3.985 0.185 0.905 1.824 0.620 
Y2008 1.513 4.578 0.741 -0.017 2.988 0.995 
Intercept 7.317 3.285 0.027 3.424 1.619 0.036 
Number of observations 252 252 
Overall significance F(2, 208) = 0.16 F(2, 208) = 1.02 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database. 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
As shown by the results of Table 5, for both outcome variables under review, we do not 
find evidence that the treatment effect varies over time. The coefficients are all jointly 
insignificant. We can thus conclude that the effects of IWT subsidies on R&D employment 
and internal R&D investment remain stable over time and that there is no evidence for a 
decline of the effect of the policy measure under consideration over time. It would be 
interesting to repeat this exercise with data covering later years, i.e. times when the financial 
crisis became effective. 
The effect of multiple subsidized projects at the same time 
Since it is possible for one firm to benefit from more than one subsidized project during the 
same period, we test whether the treatment effects are larger for firms that have more than 
one subsidized project compared to firms that have only one subsidized project or whether 
this effect is declining with the number of projects. On average, each treated firm in our 
sample has 1.5 projects in a given year. Out of our 292 treated firms in the sample, 66% have 
only one project in a given year, 19% have two projects. One firm had 26 projects. Therefore, 
it is interesting to test whether the estimated treatment effect increases with the number of 
projects a firm has or whether we witness a decrease in the effect, indicating that supporting 
several projects in a same company would not be an efficient policy to pursue. In order to test 
this, we regress the estimated treatment effect, αi, on the number of projects a firm has (see 
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Table 6). We also considered non-linear specifications, as the concern would be that 
decreasing returns exist, that is, if more projects are granted at the same time, partial 
crowding out effects could emerge. We implemented the potentially non-linear specification 
by (a) including a squared and cubic term in the regression as shown in Table 6; (b) 
estimating a non-parametric kernel regression (Nadaraya Watson estimator). Both of these 
robustness checks confirm our linear specification as shown in Table 6. In the parametric 
OLS regression, the squared and cubic terms were jointly insignificant, and the non-
parametric regression did yield a regression line very similar to the linear prediction obtained 
with the OLS regression below. We also performed a J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1981) on whether the non-parametric regression is to be preferred, and the parametric linear 
regression was not rejected.  
Table 6: Regression on the treatment effect on the number of supported projects 
 
Dependent variable: αi 
 
R&D employment R&D intensity 
 
Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t| 
Number of IWT projects 2.321 0.521 0.000 0.916 0.306 0.003 
Intercept 5.789 2.122 0.007 2.240 1.141 0.051 
Number of observations 252 252 
Overall significance F(1,208)=19.83*** F(1, 208)=8.96*** 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database.  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
Evaluation of the treatment effects of “consecutive clients” 
Funding agencies often consider previous experience (with R&D projects as well as with 
specific funding schemes) an important determinant in the selection process into a public 
subsidy scheme. As a consequence, some firms receive subsidies on a regular basis. It is thus 
interesting to evaluate whether this is a justified approach or whether one witnesses a decline 
of the subsidy effect over time if the same firm is a repetitive beneficiary. We thus test 
whether we observe a decline of the treatment effect if a firm gets funding repeatedly or 
whether the effects remain stable.  
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In order to test this, we regress the treatment effects, αi, of our respective outcome 
variables after the matching on a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had an IWT 
project that ended in the previous 3 years. As shown by Table 7, we do not find evidence that 
the treatment effect is smaller for firms that have received support for their R&D projects 
repeatedly. In other words, we do not find that the effect of a subsidy receipt decreases if a 
firm had completed an IWT project in the three years preceding the receipt of a new grant.  
Table 7: Regression testing the treatment effect of “consecutive clients” 
 
Dependent variable: αi 
 
R&D employment R&D intensity 
 
Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t| 
Dummy (IWT subsidy in the 
last 3 years) 
-5.043 7.768 0.517 4.581 3.503 0.192 
Intercept 9.927 1.814 0.000 3.151 1.054 0.001 
Number of observations 252 252 
Overall significance F(1, 208)=0.42 F(1, 208)=1.71 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database.  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
Taking subsidies from other sources into account 
Since a firm that receives support from the Flemish government can also ask for, and receive, 
support from other public agencies (i.e. form national or European entities), it is interesting to 
know for a policy maker if, and to which extent receiving a subsidy from another source 
influences the effect of a grant from a specific program under review (here: IWT grants). To 
test this, we re-estimate our matching routine, but instead of only matching on the propensity 
score, we additionally match on a dummy variable indicating whether a firm received a 
subsidy from an agency other than the IWT (for instance, the federal government or the EU). 
This means that an IWT recipient that has also received EU funding would only be matched 
with a firm that did not get an IWT subsidy, but received support from the EU. As displayed 
by Table 8, we find that our initial results hold. All the covariates are well balanced after the 
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matching, with the exception of the outcome variables where a significantly positive result 
remains. 
Table 8: Matching results, full sample: controlling for other subsidies 
  
Selected control group,  
N=215 
Subsidized firms,  
N=215 
p-value of t-tests  
on mean 
differences 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. 
   Covariates  
IWT_PAST3YRS 0.233 0.613 0.298 0.680 p=0.350 
PS/EMPL*1000 5.628 17.357 6.191 17.597 p=0.767 
LNEMP 4.482 1.927 4.318 1.656 p=0.337 
LNEMP2 23.794 18.958 21.376 15.194 p=0.174 
FOREIGN 0.293 0.456 0.247 0.432 p=0.339 
EXPO 0.553 0.498 0.540 0.500 p=0.932 
GP 0.619 0.487 0.623 0.486 p=0.930 
LNAGE 3.148 0.851 3.075 0.852 p=0.465 
LNLAB_PRO 5.331 0.739 5.230 0.701 p=0.387 
  Outcome variables 
RDINT 3.864 10.655 6.780 12.171 p=0.015 
RDEMP 9.633 18.772 17.635 21.746 p<0.001 
 
In order to investigate whether firms also getting subsidies from other sources than the 
IWT show higher crowding out effects, we regress the estimated treatment effects on the 
dummy indicating the subsidy receipt from other entities. If other subsidies would lead to 
crowding out effects we would expect a negative and significant coefficient of the dummy 
variable. As Table 9 shows, however, the estimated coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero and thus we do not find evidence that a subsidy mix leads to crowding out effects. 
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Table 9: Regression of treatment effect on the receipt of other subsidies (215 obs.) 
 
R&D employment R&D intensity 
 
Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
Dummy (subsidies received from 
other entities than the IWT) 
-3.564 4.101 0.386 -0.034 2.161 0.987 
Intercept 9.460 2.207 0.000 2.929 1.331 0.029 
Number of observations 215 215 
Overall significance F(1, 183)=0.76 F(1, 183)=0.01 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database. 
The conclusions on the other tests that we performed (the stability of the treatment effects 
over time, the potential crowding out effects of having multiple projects as well as the 
concern that repeated funding of the same firm) when the other subsidies were not taken into 
account also hold in this version of the estimation. The tables displaying the details of these 
results can be found in Appendix A2. 
Using only innovative firms 
In the previous estimations, we allowed that non-innovating firms are in the pool of potential 
controls for the matching routine. This is based on the idea that, for instance, certain small 
firms may rely heavily on IWT subsidies. In other words, it could be the case that a small 
firm could stop its R&D activities entirely if it would not be subsidized (see e.g. Czarnitzki, 
2006). Now, however, we drop the non-innovators from the control group. We thus assume 
that the firms would stay innovative even if they did not get a subsidy. Although this might 
underestimate the treatment effect to a certain extent, it is an interesting robustness check. It 
allows us to see if the magnitude of the treatment effect depends to a large extent on the “zero 
observations”, that is, non-innovators in the control group (see Appendix A3 for descriptive 
statistics of this sample). 
Before re-estimating the treatment effects, we re-estimate the probit model on subsidy 
receipt for our new sample (see Table 10). We see that the same covariates are significant as 
in the total sample. 
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Table 10: Probit estimation, only for innovative firms 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
IWT_PAST3YRS 0.648*** 0.084 
PS/EMPL*1000 0.014*** 0.002 
lnEMP -0.158 0.118 
(lnEMP)
2
 0.038*** 0.012 
FOREIGN -0.423*** 0.109 
EXPO 0.442*** 0.128 
GP 0.072 0.103 
lnAGE -0.070 0.052 
lnLAB_PRO 0.006 0.063 
Intercept -1.339*** 0.488 
Test on joint significance of industry dummies 2(9) = 64.04*** 
Test on joint significance of time dummies 2 (2) = 15.16*** 
Number of observations 1,948 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database.  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
As shown by Table 11, the estimated treatment effects are very similar to the ones 
reported above. This reaffirms our model specification as apparently the nearest neighbors 
that are drawn when using the full sample for the control group (i.e. including non-
innovators) are typically innovators. 
Table 11: Matching results, of innovative firms only 
  
Selected control group, 
N=262 
Subsidized firms,  
N=262 
p-value on the t-test on mean 
difference 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. 
   Covariates   
IWT_PAST3YRS 0.305 0.726 0.321 0.766 p=0.839 
PS_EMPL*1000 10.053 23.261 10.500 23.534 p=0.851 
lnEMP 4.387 1.648 4.426 1.707 p=0.818 
(lnEMP)
2
 21.949 15.291 22.490 16.121 p=0.733 
FOREIGN 0.271 0.445 0.263 0.441 p=0.866 
EXPORT 0.595 0.492 0.573 0.496 p=0.648 
GP 0.595 0.492 0.634 0.483 p=0.442 
lnAGE 3.149 0.855 3.091 0.860 p=0.507 
lnLAB_PRO 5.164 0.714 5.260 0.708 p=0.188 
  Outcome variables 
 RDINT 3.235 8.328 6.745 11.622 p<0.001 
RDEMP 8.145 13.390 17.220 20.670 p<0.001 
 
26 
 
Evaluating the KMO recipients separately 
Between 2004 and 2010, about two thirds of all IWT grants were handed out under the label 
of the “KMO programma”, a subsidy scheme designed for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Given that stark presence of a single scheme within the landscape of programs, 
we performed the estimations reported above separately for these subsidy recipients. Since 
this program was designed in the goal of enhancing R&D and innovation in small and 
medium-sized firms, a firm has to fall into this category in order to be eligible for the KMO 
grants. Firms that do not fall into this category have, as a consequence, been deleted from the 
sample for this analysis.
7
 For details on descriptive statistics for this sample, see Appendix 
A3.  
The results of the Probit model on the subsidy receipt are very similar to the full 
sample. Therefore, we omit a detailed presentation here. As shown by Table 12, the estimated 
treatment effects are in line with those reported when considering all IWT schemes. After the 
matching, all the covariates are well balanced with the exception of the outcome variables, 
where positive significant differences exist due to the receipt of a grant. 
We thus confirm our earlier findings of input additionality in the KMO program. 
Furthermore, the treatment effects are somewhat larger in the case of KMO subsidies than in 
the full sample using also other schemes as treatment. This finding was expected, since one 
would suppose that the effect of a grant is higher for an SME than for a larger firm in terms 
of its relative impact on total R&D efforts of the firm. Furthermore, the KMO subsidies cover 
10% more of the cost of an R&D project for small firms than the other grants. The results are 
thus in line with what one would except to observe. 
                                                 
7
 According to the EU’s definition, an SME should have less than 250 employees and has either sales less than 
€40 million or a balance sheet less than €27 million. 800 firms are concerned by this eligibility restriction in our 
sample. 
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Table 12: Matching results, KMO recipients only 
  
Selected control group, 
N=112 
Subsidized firms,  
N=112 
p-value on the t-test 
on mean difference 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. 
   Covariates   
KMO_PAST3YRS 0.098 0.354 0.152 0.429 p=0.327 
PS/EMPL*1000 5.672 16.376 5.873 16.980 p=0.536 
lnEMP 3.355 1.093 3.282 1.027 p=0.626 
(lnEMP)
2
 12.439 6.815 11.816 6.379 p=0.502 
FOREIGN 0.045 0.207 0.036 0.186 p=0.748 
EXPORT 0.616 0.488 0.553 0.499 p=0.366 
GP 0.429 0.497 0.330 0.472 p=0.149 
lnAGE 2.884 0.771 2.995 0.797 p=0.311 
lnLAB_PRO 5.123 0.683 4.999 0.617 p=0.178 
  Outcome variables 
 RDINT 2.583 7.323 7.088 12.780 P=0.002 
RDEMP 8.533 20.722 18.726 22.678 p=0.001 
Robustness test: taking potential selection on unobservable characteristics into account 
In this subsection, we describe our efforts to search for instrumental variables in order to also 
estimate models controlling for “selection on unobservables” that complement the application 
of matching estimators. 
As described in the previous section, special funding rules exist for SMEs. Besides the 
fact that SMEs are eligible for a specific program (the KMO program), they receive a higher 
percentage rate of the total project costs covered depending on whether they are medium-
sized enterprises (a maximum of 35% is covered) or small-sized enterprises (a maximum of 
45% is covered)
8
 provided that they are not part of a group. Hence, a potential instrument for 
our analysis would have been the inclusion of dummy variables equal to one if a firm 
qualifies as a small-sized (respectively a medium-sized enterprise) that is not part of a group. 
As a matter of fact, given the extra expenses covered for small firms in the KMO program, 
respectively for small and medium-sized firms in the R&D program, the eligible firms could 
                                                 
8
 The definition of medium and small sized firms is the one by the EU, i.e. a firm qualifies as small-sized 
firm if it has less than 49 employees and less than € 10,000 of turnover. It qualifies as medium-sized firm if it 
has between 50 and 249 employees and an annual turnover larger than 10,000 and smaller than € 50,000.  
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have an additional incentive to submit a project to the IWT, given that for the same cost of 
applying, the potential gain for the latter is higher. Since the definition of small and medium 
sized is decided upon by the European Commission and since a firm would not choose the 
number of its employees in light of the eligibility criteria of a specific subsidy program, such 
a dummy would fulfil the condition of being (i) correlated with the endogenous dummy 
variable indicating the treatment and (ii) uncorrelated with the error term of the structural 
equation once the we control for the other covariates.   
Unfortunately, neither one of these two dummy variable was significant in the first stage 
regression on the subsidy receipt. Thus we did not find that our preferred instruments based 
on exploiting discontinuities in the program rules to be relevant. Consequently, we can only 
go ahead with a “second best” solution. An option that our data offers is to use lags of the 
subsidy receipt as instrumental variables. Although not perfect, as one might be concerned 
whether lagged subsidies are truly exogenous to the system of equations (as subsidies might 
be serially correlated), they at least allow a rough robustness check to see whether our main 
results hold when we abandon the conditional independence assumption and allow for 
selection on unobservables. We experimented with different lag structures and found that 
using “the number of subsidized projects that ended in period t-2” along with their average 
size ( = “total amount of the subsidy in thsd. EUR” divided by the number of subsidized 
projects) fulfil the statistical requirements for instrumental variables. We found that these two 
instruments are relevant in the first stage on the number of current subsidized projects, and 
also pass the over-identification test (Hansen J-test). Thus we conclude that at least in terms 
of statistical requirements, the instruments can be considered as valid. 
Due to space limitations we only show the detailed results of the baseline regressions 
investigating the relationship between R&D intensity (and R&D employment) and the 
number of subsidized projects the firm is currently conducting. As Table 13 shows our main 
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results identified with the matching estimator also hold when using IV regressions. The effect 
of the number of subsidized projects is positive and significant. In terms of magnitude of the 
effect, we also find similar results to the matching procedure. 
Table 13: Instrumental variable regressions using full sample and subsample of innovators 
                                           
      IV regression, full sample 
 (4,761 obs.) 
IV regression, innovator sample  
(1,948 obs.) 
  
R&D INTENSITY 
R&D 
EMPLOYMENT 
R&D INTENSITY 
R&D 
EMPLOYMENT 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
# of current IWT 
projects  
1.242 *** 2.701 *** 1.074 *** 2.342 *** 
                                           (0.369)     (0.629)     (0.314)     (0.508)     
PS/(EMPL*1000)                                    107.434 *** 203.829 *** 113.718 *** 202.138 *** 
                                           (25.848)     (41.061)     (27.862)     (41.875)     
lnEMP                                     0.407     -1.104     0.162     -4.152 **  
                                           (0.381)     (1.058)     (0.746)     (1.657)     
(lnEMP)
2
                                     -0.064     0.044     -0.063     0.24     
                                           (0.049)     (0.120)     (0.082)     (0.168)     
FOREIGN                                  0.469     0.103     1.298 *   1.152     
                                           (0.374)     (0.557)     (0.720)     (1.018)     
EXPORT 0.827 *** 2.71 *** 1.218 **  4.073 *** 
                                           (0.197)     (0.378)     (0.587)     (0.966)     
GP           0.516 **  0.784 *   1.211 **  1.091     
                                           (0.250)     (0.414)     (0.538)     (0.856)     
lnAGE                                      -0.2 **  -0.533 **  -0.22     -0.636     
                                           (0.095)     (0.209)     (0.193)     (0.417)     
lnLAB_PRO -0.446 *** 0.109     -1.155 *** 0.499     
                                           (0.133)     (0.185)     (0.382)     (0.501)     
Intercept                2.834 *** 7.419 *** 7.447 *** 16.171 *** 
                                           (0.971)     (2.490)     (2.653)     (5.130)     
F test of excluded 
instruments  32.92 *** 32.92 *** 33.17 *** 33.17 *** 
Hansen J 
overidentification 
test  
2.14 
  
1.486 
  
2.424 
  
1.921   
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered. 
All models contain full sets of industry and time dummies (not reported). The number of current IWT projects 
has been instrumented with the number of IWT projects that ended in period t-2 as well as the average size (in 
terms of thsd. EUR) per project. 
We also obtain similar results when we use a treatment dummy instead of the number of 
currently funded projects as regressor (not presented in detail). Furthermore, using parametric 
treatment (or “selection”) models also result in the same conclusions. 
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7. Macroeconomic impact of IWT subsidies 
In order to put the treatment effect into context, we conduct a ‘back of the envelope’ 
calculation on macroeconomic effects of the IWT subsidies.
9
 In particular, we are interested 
in knowing how many (R&D) jobs these public grants create. In our sample, the R&D 
employment intensity amounts to 8% for the firms composing the selected control group (i.e. 
the treated firms, if they would not have gotten a subsidy).  
At the sample median
10
, total employment equals 49 employees, say 50 for easier 
calculation. Thus, in the counterfactual situation, a treated company would employ about 4 
R&D employees (8% R&D employment intensity).  
The treatment effect of a subsidy receipt concerning R&D employment intensity (i.e. 
the ratio of R&D employees to total employment) amounts to about 9.567 percentage points, 
that is, each treatment in our context creates or secures about 5 R&D jobs.
11
  
On average, the recipient firms have 1.5 IWT projects in a given year. In total, the 
IWT granted 3,019 projects with a total subsidy value of € 628 million between 2004 and 
2010. As each company in our sample has on average 1.5 project in a given year, the 
estimated 5 R&D jobs are created 2,012 times in total (= 3,019/1.5). Thus, in total the 
subsidies create 10,060 (R&D) jobs (2,012 * 5). Note that our treatment effects calculation is 
based on annual data. As the average project duration is about 20 months, the subsidies create 
a total sum of 16,800 (10,060 * (20/12)) person-years of R&D employment in the Flemish 
economy. Given that this result is achieved with a total budget of € 628 million of public 
budget, society pays about € 37,000 per created R&D employment per person per year. 
                                                 
9
 The following calculations refer to the first analysis, namely the entire sample (innovative and non-innovative 
firms), containing KMO and the R&D subsidy schemes.  
10
We take the median rather than the mean because of the skewness of the employment distribution. 
11
 Average number of R&D employees in the selected control group :  50*0.08 = 4 
If treatment is received, increase of 9.567 percentage points. Hence: 50*(0.08+0.096) = 8.8 ~ 9 
Additional jobs created or secured:     9 – 4 = 5 
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From the Flemish R&D survey
12
, we calculated the average cost of an R&D 
workplace. In other words, we calculated the R&D personnel cost, including the employers’ 
social security contribution and the average annual working expenses for maintaining an 
R&D workplace. According to the R&D survey 2008, this cost amounts to € 64,000 on 
average. Thus, we can conclude that € 37,000 are sponsored by public funding, and the 
companies’ average contribution amount to roughly € 27,000. Note that this is a back of the 
envelope calculation based on averages, and that we do not want to stress that this could be 
evidence on partial crowding out. As the subsidy rate is on average 40% of total project cost, 
one could expect that the industry share in the total work place cost should be higher than € 
27,000. However, one has to keep in mind that we only take into account the firm’s costs 
linked to R&D employment, disregarding other expenses like e.g. lab equipment and similar 
assets a firm has to invest in when conducting R&D projects. Such costs have not been taken 
into account in our ballpark figure.  
8. Conclusion 
The present paper presents new microeconometric evidence on the question of input 
additionality for a Belgian subsidy scheme. While many papers have analyzed the impact of 
subsidies on firms’ innovative behavior, there is no econometric evidence on how this effect 
might change over time or how it might be affected if several projects are supported at the 
same time respectively if the firm gets support on a regular basis and when firms also receive 
support from other sources. This paper allows answering these questions, revealing important 
information for policy makers.  
In line with the literature, we can reject the null hypothesis of total crowding out. Our 
further investigations allow us to conclude that we do not witness varying effects over time 
                                                 
12
 The Flemish part of the OECD R&D survey is conducted every second year by the Centre for R&D 
Monitoring at the KU Leuven.  
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and that multiple grants at the same time do not cause crowding out effects. We can also 
conclude that there is no declining effect if firms get subsidies recurrently or if firms 
additionally receive support from other sources.  
Finally, we estimate the macroeconomic impact of these Flemish subsidies on the local 
economy in terms of (R&D) jobs that are created. On average, one supported project creates 
5 (R&D) jobs, out of which roughly € 37,000 are paid for by the public and € 27,000 by the 
firm. Keeping in mind that this figure is based only on the cost directly related to an 
employee and not including any equipment costs a firm encounters when hiring an additional 
person, our findings do not suggest crowding out. As we found that subsidies do increase the 
number of R&D employees, we can conclude that the additional investment in R&D does not 
just go into increased wages of the R&D personnel. In many previous studies, information on 
the number of employees allowing to draw this conclusion is often missing.  
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Appendix A1: Industry structure and firm size distribution 
Table A1: Industry structure 
Industry Number of firms 
Food, beverages and tobacco 364 
Textiles, clothing and leather 213 
Chemicals (incl. pharma), rubber and plastics 346 
Metal 400 
Machinery and vehicles 415 
Electronics, communication and instruments 193 
Other manufacturing industries 1400 
Trade 738 
ICT services 415 
Other business services 277 
Total 4761 
 
Table A2: Size distribution 
Size class distribution Number of firms 
1 - 4 135 
5 - 9 552 
10 - 49 2,389 
50 - 249 1,216 
250 – max. 469 
Total 4761 
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Appendix A2: Detailed results if the receipt of other grants is 
added as matching criterion 
Table A3: OLS regression testing for stability of treatment effect over time 
 
Dependent variable: αi 
 
R&D employment R&D intensity 
 
Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t| 
Y2006 -3.228 4.303 0.454 -1.579 1.735 0.364 
Y2008 1.230 4.840 0.800 .365 3.110 0.907 
Intercept 8.653 3.368 0.011 3.302 1.431 0.022 
Number of observations 215 215 
Overall significance F(1, 183) = 0.76 F(1, 183) = 0.54 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database.  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
Table A4: Regression of the treatment effect on the number of supported projects 
 
Dependent variable: αi 
 
R&D employment R&D intensity 
 
Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t| 
Number of IWT projects 2.761 0.771 0.000 1.180 0.459 0.011 
Intercept 3.622 2.438 0.139 1.044 1.278 0.415 
Number of observations 215 215 
Overall significance F(1, 183) = 12.81*** F(1, 183) = 6.61*** 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database.  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
Table A5: Regression testing the treatment effect of “consecutive clients” 
 
Dependent variable: αi 
 
R&D employment R&D intensity 
 
Coef. Std. err. P>|t| Coef. Std. err. P>|t| 
Dummy (IWT subsidy in the 
last 3 years) 
13.911 7.999 0.084 10.563 5.020 0.037 
Intercept 7.289 1.973 0.000 2.375 1.077 0.029 
Number of observations 215 215 
Overall significance F(1, 183) = 3.02* F(1, 183) = 4.43** 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, as a few firms appear more than once in the database.  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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Appendix A3: Descriptive statistics for the “innovative only” as 
well as the SME sample 
Table A6: Descriptive statistics, only innovative firms 
 
Unsubsidized firms, 
N=1656 
Subsidized firms,  
N=292 
Results of t-test 
on mean 
difference 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.  
 
Covariates  
IWT_PAST3YRS 0.054 0.281 0.736 2.436 *** 
PS/EMPL*1000 2.528 11.366 13.457 27.277 *** 
lnEMP 3.890 1.399 4.690 1.884 *** 
(lnEMP)
2
 17.089 12.137 25.535 19.005 *** 
FOREIGN 0.290 0.454 0.284 0.452  
EXPORT 0.434 0.496 0.545 0.499 *** 
GP 0.557 0.497 0.664 0.473 *** 
lnAGE 3.136 0.838 3.153 0.889  
lnLAB_PRO 5.284 0.791 5.279 0.701  
 
Outcome variables  
RDINT 2.413 8.533 7.579 12.694 *** 
RDEMP 6.851 14.916 18.287 21.980 *** 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
Table A7: Descriptive statistics, only small and medium sized firms 
  
Unsubsidized firms, 
N=3839 
Subsidized firms,  
N=122 
Results of t-test 
on mean 
difference 
Variables Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.  
  Covariates  
KMO_PAST3YRS 0.018 0.143 0.303 0.791 *** 
PS/EMPL*1000 1.249 8.182 8.178 20.797 *** 
lnEMP 3.133 0.981 3.296 1.034 * 
(lnEMP)
2
 10.775 6.359 11.923 6.570 * 
FOREIGN 0.187 0.390 0.033 0.179 *** 
EXPO 0.367 0.482 0.525 0.501 *** 
GP 0.396 0.489 0.344 0.477  
lnAGE 3.069 0.765 2.996 0.786  
lnLAB_PRO 5.078 0.791 5.001 0.599  
  Outcome variables  
RDINT 1.083 5.912 7.092 12.360 *** 
RDEMP 3.084 11.264 19.277 22.738 *** 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
